The intake queue is already too long. A clinic is tomorrow. A funder report is due Friday. Then someone leaves, planned or not, and your team realizes the quiet risk: they still have access to client files, shared inboxes, and partner portals.
Offboarding isn’t an HR formality. In legal aid, court support, and justice-serving nonprofits, offboarding is client protection. It’s the difference between a clean handoff and a confidentiality incident you can’t undo.
Key takeaways (24-hour offboarding essentials)
- Treat access like a safety control, not a courtesy, remove it fast and document it.
- Start with identity first, lock the account, then work outward to email, SaaS apps, devices, and shared accounts.
- Recover files with chain-of-custody thinking, preserve what matters, avoid copying sensitive data into new shadow folders.
- Close shared accounts and “helpful” workarounds, shared passwords, personal MFA phones, and mystery admin logins.
- Make verification a required step, “we think we removed access” is not the same as proof.
- Assign decision rights up front, offboarding fails when ownership is vague.
Why a tight employee offboarding checklist matters in justice work
A strong employee offboarding checklist does two jobs at once: it protects clients and it protects your organization’s credibility.
When offboarding slips, the harm isn’t theoretical. It looks like:
- A former staffer still seeing case notes in a shared drive.
- A departed contractor with access to a partner portal used for referrals.
- A shared Gmail password that never gets changed because nobody remembers it exists.
- A staff phone that was the only MFA method for a shared account.
If your systems are already fragmented, offboarding becomes harder because nobody has a full map. That’s one reason leadership teams feel stuck in “login chasing” mode, a pattern described in technology challenges in justice-focused nonprofits.
Offboarding is like changing the locks after giving someone a key. You don’t start by hunting for every key copy. You change the lock, then you inventory what else needs re-secured.
Before you need it: decision rights and one “stop doing this”
A 24-hour offboard only works if people know who’s allowed to pull the trigger.
Decision rights (simple version):
- HR or People Ops confirms departure details and timing.
- Ops owns asset return logistics.
- IT (internal or outsourced) owns account actions.
- Program lead owns case handoff and client continuity.
- Executive sponsor breaks ties when tradeoffs show up.
Stop doing this: stop using shared passwords and “everyone knows it” admin logins.
Shared access creates speed in the moment, then creates slow panic later. If a shared account must exist, it needs an owner, an MFA method not tied to one person’s phone, and a documented recovery path.
If you want a practical way to sequence governance like this without overwhelming staff, a step-by-step tech guide for legal aid organizations is the right kind of framing: small moves, clear owners, steady progress.
The 24-hour offboarding plan (what to do, when, and what “done” looks like)

| Time window | What to do (minimum) | Owner | Proof to capture |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 to 1 hour | Disable primary identity (SSO/AD/Azure AD/Google), revoke sessions, reset passwords if needed | IT | Ticket note with timestamp, admin audit log screenshot (stored securely) |
| 1 to 4 hours | Remove access to case systems, file storage, password manager, VPN, finance/HR tools, partner portals | IT + Ops | Checklist with each system marked and verified |
| 4 to 8 hours | Secure email and messaging, set forwarding rules, delegate mailbox, preserve critical threads | IT + Program lead | Confirmation of mailbox status, forwarding owner |
| 8 to 24 hours | Recover devices and files, transfer ownership of shared accounts, rotate shared secrets, close gaps found | Ops + IT + Program lead | Asset return log, shared account owner list updated |
The goal isn’t perfection in 24 hours. The goal is risk reduction you can defend: access is closed, data is protected, shared accounts are owned, and you have evidence.
Step 1: Remove access fast (identity-first, then everything else)
Start at the center: identity. Disable the primary account, revoke active sessions, and remove MFA methods under that user. This prevents “it still works on their phone” surprises.
Then work outward in a consistent order:
- Email and collaboration: mailbox access, shared drives, Teams/Slack, group memberships.
- Core program tools: case management, intake forms, e-sign tools used for client docs.
- Infrastructure access: VPN, remote desktop, admin portals, cloud consoles.
- High-risk secrets: password manager vaults, API keys, OAuth app grants.
A useful framing is IBM’s reminder that offboarding is about “closing digital doors,” not just disabling one login. Their overview is a solid cross-check when you want to pressure-test your process: Offboarding: A Checklist for Safely Closing an Employee’s Digital Doors.
One practical tip that prevents missed systems: ask, “What could they approve?” not only “What can they see?” Approvals in finance tools, HR systems, and vendor portals are where quiet damage happens.
Step 2: Recover files without creating new confidentiality risk
File recovery is where good intentions create messy exposure. People panic, drag folders onto a desktop, and now sensitive documents exist in three new places.
Aim for a controlled, minimal-touch process:
- Recover the device first, don’t rely on last-minute uploads.
- Preserve what you must, especially time-sensitive client materials and work product.
- Transfer ownership instead of copying, when the tool supports it (shared drive folders, shared mailboxes, cloud files).
- Document what moved and why, so you can answer questions later.

If your organization struggles with where “the real version” of a file lives, that’s not a staff failure. It’s a system design issue, and it shows up hardest during exits.
Step 3: Close shared accounts (the places offboarding usually fails)
Shared accounts are the trapdoors: they bypass your normal controls and often have the broadest access.
Prioritize these:
- Shared inboxes and voicemail: assign an owner, remove the departed user, rotate passwords if used.
- Social media and comms tools: transfer admin roles, remove personal accounts, rotate recovery emails and phone numbers.
- Vendor portals: e-filing, partner referral tools, background check portals, payment tools, domain/DNS registrar.
- Grant and reporting systems: anywhere staff upload data to a funder or coalition.
If you’re trying to fix this systematically, it helps to see examples of how organizations reduced risk while lowering operational drag. The patterns are often repeatable: real results from legal nonprofit technology projects.
Verification and documentation (the part boards expect)
Offboarding is not complete until someone confirms:
- Access is removed (not just “should be removed”).
- Shared accounts have named owners.
- Assets are returned or remotely secured.
- The case handoff is real, not assumed.
A simple “offboarding packet” helps: checklist, timestamps, asset log, and notes on exceptions (with an end date). Keep it secure, and keep it consistent.
FAQs: Offboarding, access removal, and shared accounts
How fast should we remove access when someone leaves?
For most roles, within the first hour of the departure being effective. If the departure is planned, schedule deactivation for the last working minute, then verify immediately.
What if we can’t retrieve a device within 24 hours?
Disable access first, then focus on recovery. If the device might hold sensitive client data, document the situation, attempt remote lock or wipe where appropriate, and escalate it as a risk item with a clear owner.
How do we handle a shared account that uses one person’s phone for MFA?
That’s a fix to schedule, not a reason to delay offboarding. Transfer MFA to an org-controlled method (shared phone under policy, hardware key held by ops, or an identity platform), then rotate credentials.
Do we need to keep a departed employee’s email?
Often, yes, for continuity and records, but they shouldn’t have access. Convert to a mailbox you control, apply retention rules, and set forwarding or delegation to a role account.
What’s the most common offboarding miss?
OAuth and app grants, third-party tools connected to Google or Microsoft accounts. If you don’t review connected apps, old access can persist even after a password change.
Conclusion
A calm offboarding process is a gift to your staff and your clients. It reduces fear, reduces rework, and makes confidentiality real, not aspirational. If your team is piecing this together across too many tools and too few hours, it may be time to get a clear, workable baseline in place. To talk through a realistic plan you can defend to leadership, boards, and funders, schedule a 30-minute clarity call: https://ctoinput.com/schedule-a-call.
Which single chokepoint, shared accounts, file storage, or identity control, if fixed this quarter, would unlock the most capacity and trust?